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Abstract
The rapid rise of IoT and Big Data has facilitated copious data driven applications to
enhance our quality of life. However, the omnipresent and all-encompassing nature
of the data collection can generate privacy concerns. Hence, there is a strong need
to develop techniques that ensure the data serve only the intended purposes, giving
users control over the information they share. To this end, this paper studies new
variants of supervised and adversarial learning methods, which remove sensitive
information in the data before they are sent out for a particular application. The
explored methods optimize privacy preserving feature mappings and predictive
models simultaneously in an end-to-end fashion. Additionally, the models are built
with an emphasis on placing little computational burden on the user side, which
enables users to desensitize their data on device in a cheap manner.
1 Introduction
With more of our daily activities moving online, a vast amount of personal information is being
collected, stored and shared across the internet. Although this information can be used for the
benefit of the data owners, it can also leak sensitive information about individuals. Mobile-sensing
readings, for instance, can be beneficially used for activity recognition [1], medical diagnosis [2], or
authentication [3]; nevertheless, they can also be used to infer sensitive information about individuals
such as location, context and identity [4, 5].
The possibility of applying machine learning (ML) for adversarial purposes motivates the application
of the principle of least privilege to big data [6], i.e., to give service providers access to only the
information necessary for the intended utility, but nothing else. Our methods, hence, follow this
principle by seeking the feature representation of the data such that it maximizes the information on
the utility task, but removes unwanted correlations.
Our work is intended to allow privacy preservation to be performed by the data owner even before any
information can be extracted. Therefore, we consider two spheres in our design, the private sphere
and the public sphere. Based on this separation, lossy compression needs to occur in the private
sphere, such that any data released to the public sphere should be viable only to the intended purpose.
To achieve such design, we employ sequential models, whose computations can be seamlessly
divided between private and public spheres. From the system’s perspective, the private sphere is thus
concerned with employing data compression to maximize the utility information while removing
redundant or sensitive information. The public sphere, on the other hand, is concerned with making
utility predictions on the compressed data. Since both spheres serve the same utility goal, we optimize
them jointly. Also, in an effort to reduce the burden on the users, we place the majority of the model
computations in the public sphere, i.e., after the data is desensitized by the owner.
The main contributions in this paper are summarized below. We hope that these will motivate future
research into this under-explored learning setting with conflicting utility and privacy goals.
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• We build and explore a variety of optimization objectives tailored towards removing depen-
dencies between data representations and sensitive attributes. Among these, the Maximum
Mean Discrepancy (MMD) [7], the Wasserstein Discriminator Network (WDN) [8] and
the Least Squares Discriminator Network (LSDN) [9] objectives have their roots in the
generative adversarial learning framework, while the Kernel Discriminant Information (KDI)
[10] objective has its roots in Kernel Discriminant Analysis. Because these objectives have
not been used in scenarios similar to ours, we make substantial efforts to analyze their merits
relative to each other.
• We present novel techniques for optimizing privacy enhancing feature mappings as well as
the predictive models that take them as inputs. Our methods are lightweight in the sense that
they require minimal modifications to existing learning algorithms and model structures.
• We demonstrate the viability of our privacy enhancing learning techniques on mobile sensing
and face image datasets, where we hide the identities of the users. Our experiments showcase
that, under the right conditions, we can remove almost all the sensitive information within
the data with minimal loss in utility performance. Furthermore, our methods are able to
limit the utility performance losses in high privacy settings even when we restrict ourselves
to linear feature mappings on the user side.
1.1 Related Works
A large body of work onto privacy enhancing machine learning focuses on making the model
parameters or predictions differentially private with respect to their training examples [11, 12, 13,
14, 15, 16, 17]. That is to say, these works make the models statistically indistinguishable when
conditioned on the presence or absence of a training sample, effectively hiding individual samples
among a crowd of training data. Our work is orthogonal to this approach, because we aim to
remove unwanted information directly from individual samples. Nevertheless, our approach could be
combined with differentially private learning mechanisms to hide the participation of users, when
their data serve to train the privacy preserving models that we develop.
Some of the early works concerned with desensitizing data rely on random projections to preserve
pairwise distances between data points, while making the original data entries difficult to reconstruct
[18, 19]. While such projections may serve some privacy benefits and maintain the performance
of certain ML models, they make no distinctions between desirable and undesirable correlations in
the data, hence, they are insufficient to serve our goals. More recent works in [20, 21], on the other
hand, propose suitable projection techniques, which maximize correlations with a utility variable
and minimize correlations with a privacy variable. These works utilize the linear variant of the
Discriminant Information (DI) criterion (a more general criterion is covered in Section 2.3.1) for both
the utility and the privacy targets, though, they do not go beyond optimizing shallow linear or kernel
based projections of the data.
The work in [22] separates learning models into public and private spheres much like our design, but,
the compression methods in the private sphere only focus on the utility goals and do not take explicit
privacy targets into account. In [23], the authors attempt to remove dependencies between binary
sensitive variables and dense neural network representations by utilizing an approximation of the
Maximum Mean Discrepancy (MMD) objective (covered in Section 2.2.1). In [24] an alternative
objective is proposed via linear mappings approximating the Wasserstein Distance (a more general
methodology is covered in Section 2.2.2) and a multi-class extension is included similar to the one
we present in Section 2.2.3.
Our methods are suitable for optimizing more general classes of data representations than the
previous works, such as convolutional neural network (CNN) mappings, which, as we showcase, are
not appropriate for our purposes without some modifications. Additionally, we present and analyze
a comprehensive set of learning objectives suitable for removing unwanted dependencies in the
data. The proposed objectives are capable of handling multi-class private variables, with some being
capable of handling continuous-valued private variables as well.
1.2 Notation
Throughout this paper, we refer to (deterministic) matrices with bold, capital letters, vectors with
bold, small letters and scalars with regular letters. We reserve the letter X to refer to data, Z := φ(X)
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to refer to the processed data and S to refer to sensitive information. When we talk about empirical
data, X = [x1 . . .xN ] refers to the data matrix, Z = [z1 . . . zN ] := [φ(x1) . . . φ(xN )] refers to the
processed data matrix, and s = [s1 . . . sN ]> refers to the privacy label vector containing the sensitive
attributes. If we talk about privacy labels in matrix form, we refer to P = [s1 . . . sN ]>. Because the
letter S is commonly used to denote the scatter matrix, we reserve it for that purpose. We commonly
use C := I− 1N 1 to refer to the centering matrix. Also, for a feature mapping φ(·) that takes as input
a data sample x, we commonly use φ(X) as a shorthand to refer to [φ(x1) . . . φ(xN )].
We generally refer to kernel functions as k(·, ·), and reserve the letter K for the N ×N kernel matrix
obtained from the processed data matrix Z, where Kij = k(zi, zj). Additionally, we use k(A,B) as
a shorthand to refer to a kernel matrix with kij(A,B) = k(ai,bj).
‖ · ‖2 refers to the l2 norm for vectors and the spectral norm for matrices, while ‖ · ‖F refers to the
Frobenius norm. For a matrix M, we use trace(M) to denote its trace, M−1 to denote its inverse,
M+ to denote its pseudo-inverse. Finally, when we talk about a loss function L(·; ·), the parameters
used to minimize the loss come after the semi-colon, and anything before is treated as a constant.
2 Privacy Enhancing Learning Objectives
2.1 Background
In this section, we discuss learning objectives that can be useful for removing sensitive information
from data. Before we delve into details, we first ask the fundamental question: Given only empirical
data and no prior information about the underlying structure, how can we characterize the level of
privacy achieved by a system?
Obviously, perfect privacy is achieved in the case when the processed data Z = φ(X) is independent
from the sensitive attribute S. We can characterize this system with PZS = PZPS , or PZ|S = PZ ,
that is, the distribution of the processed data is not affected by any realization of the sensitive attribute
S. Since we do not know the underlying distribution PXS , we need to measure the significance of the
difference between PZ and PZ|S purely based on an i.i.d. sample {(xi, si)}Ni=1 with (xi, si) ∼ PXS .
For simplicity, let us consider the binary case S ∈ {0, 1}. Then, perfect privacy corresponds to
the realization of PZ|S=0 = PZ|S=1, where Z = φ(X). Given only a finite sample generated by
PXS , an arbitrary mapping φ and no knowledge of the data generating process, however, we cannot
determine whether this system achieves perfect privacy without any doubt. What we can do is to test
our confidence in the hypothesis PZ|S=0 = PZ|S=1 based on our observations. Thus, a measure of
privacy based solely upon empirical data can be defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Model Free Binary Privacy Measure). Let D(S0,S1) be a measure of distance between
the empirical distributions of two sets of samples S0, S1. Assume we have N i.i.d. samples
{(zi, si)}Ni=1, each obtained from PZS , with si ∈ {0, 1}. Let D(Z0,Z1) = γ be the observed
distance between the empirical distributions of two disjoint subsets of {zi}Ni=1: Z0 = {zi : si = 0},Z1 = {zi : si = 1}, with |Zj | = Nj . Then, our privacy confidence is given by P[D(Z0, Z1) ≤ γ],
where Z0, Z1 are independent random sets of samples with sizes N0 and N1, which are obtained
i.i.d. from the marginal distribution PZ .
We basically defined our privacy measure as our confidence in the null hypothesis: The processed
data Z = φ(X) is independent from the binary sensitive attribute S. Accordingly, we assume that
PZ|S=0 = PZ|S=1 = PZ , then obtain the likelihood of the observed difference between empirical
distributions.
While the actual methods to obtain p-values for such hypotheses can be quite involved (often
incorporating density estimation methods and bootstrapping), all we need to observe from Definition
1 is that the smaller D(Z0,Z1) is, the more confident we are in the assumption that Z does not
leak information about S. Hence, for a parametric feature mapping φ(x;θ), an appropriate privacy
preservation objective would be D({φ(xi;θ) : si = 0}, {φ(xi;θ) : si = 1}).
To summarize, an appropriate empirical privacy objective tries to make the distributions of processed
data look identical when conditioned on different values of the private variable. While the example we
gave works for binary private variables only, we can generalize it to multi-class private variables in a
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straightforward One-vs-Rest fashion. Some of the objectives we shall present are also straightforward
to generalize to continuous private variables, as they are related to the minimum least-squares error.
2.2 Integral Probability Metrics
We covered how privacy objectives can be defined from distances between empirical distributions
in the previous section, now, we shall introduce a class of distance measures that are suitable for
empirical data. Integral Probability Metrics (IPMs) are among the most commonly used distance
measures in the literature to ensure closeness of empirical distributions [25, 8]. These can be generally
defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Integral Probability Metric). Let P0, P1 be two probability measures defined on X , with
Z0 ∼ P0 and Z1 ∼ P1. Let F be a class of bounded functions f : Z → R, an Integral Probability
Metric D(·, ·) is defined as
DIPM (P0, P1) = sup
f∈F
{E [f(Z0)]− E [f(Z1)]} . (1)
To define a proper metric, we require the function class F to be large enough to achieve positive
supremum for all instances, where P0 6= P1. The choice of F leads to crucial distinctions between
IPMs [26], a few examples of which are as follows:
• If we set F to be all functions over X bounded by 1, (1) recovers the Total Variation
Distance (TVD).
• If we set F to be all 1-Lipschitz functions over X , (1) recovers the Wasserstein Distance
(WD) [8].
• If we set F to be the unit ball of a Reproducing Kernel Hilbert Space (RKHS) [27], (1)
recovers the Maximum Mean Discrepancy (MMD) [25].
Of these three examples, we focus on WD and MMD because of their sensitivity to the topology of
the distributions P0, P1 [28].1
2.2.1 Maximum Mean Discrepancy (MMD)
It is convenient to start with MMD due to the closed form expressions of its estimates. We thus refer
to the biased statistic in [25] as the (squared) MMD objective, since it works better than the unbiased
statistic in practice. Assuming we have N samples {(zi, si)}Ni=1 with si ∈ {0, 1} and Nj samples
for which si = j, we can define the MMD statistic as
MMD =
√
1
N20
∑
si=0
∑
sj=0
k(zi, zj) +
1
N21
∑
si=1
∑
sj=1
k(zi, zj)− 2
N0N1
∑
si=0
∑
sj=1
k(zi, zj). (2)
The MMD statistic (2) is simply a closed form expression of the IPM (1) when F is the unit ball of
an RKHS and P0, P1 are empirical distributions of the data. To see this, let us first express the IPM
based on our sample,
MMDsample = sup
f : ‖f‖H≤1
{
1
N0
∑
si=0
f(zi)− 1
N1
∑
si=1
f(zi)
}
, (3)
with H denoting an RKHS. Since the data is drawn from a compact set X , the mean emdeddings
µ0 :=
1
N0
∑
si=0
k(zi, ·) and µ1 := 1N1
∑
si=1
k(zi, ·) will be inside the RKHS. Then, by Riesz
1TVD is not affected by the closeness of the supports of P0 and P1 when they are disjoint. This makes TVD
a difficult objective to be utilized with gradient based techniques, because there will not be suitable descent
directions in areas where the supports do not overlap.
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Representer Theorem [29], we can rewrite (3) as
MMDsample = sup
f : ‖f‖H≤1
〈
1
N0
∑
si=0
k(zi, ·)− 1
N1
∑
si=1
k(zi, ·), f
〉
H
(4)
=
∥∥∥∥∥ 1N0 ∑si=0 k(zi, ·)−
1
N1
∑
si=1
k(zi, ·)
∥∥∥∥∥
H
(5)
= MMD, (6)
where MMD is as defined in (2) and the last equality is due to the reproducing property
〈k(zi, ·), k(zj , ·)〉H = k(zi, zj).
The MMD defines a proper metric on a compact set X when the RKHSH is universal. An RKHS is
universal when k(·, ·) is continuous andH is dense in the set of all continuous functions [25]. Clearly,
universal approximators like Gaussian and Laplacian are also universal kernels, since their RKHSs
are dense in the set of all measurable functions. The fact that universality leads to a proper metric
on a compact set is a consequence of MMD(P0, P1) = 0 being equivalent to P0 and P1 having all
their moments equal. Note that matching all their moments is sufficient for equalizing distributions,
provided the distributions have supports over compact sets.
As a sidenote we would like to add that, while weaker kernels like polynomials do not define proper
metrics, their MMD still has an extremely useful interpretation. For a 4th order polynomial kernel
k(zi, zj) =
(
1 + γ
(
z>i zj
))4
, for instance, MMD(P0, P1) = 0 implies P0, P1 have matching mean,
variance, skew and kurtosis [7, 25]. Therefore, MMD can be used to remove correlations up to a
certain order, if such processing is known to be sufficient.
2.2.2 Wasserstein Discriminator Network (WDN)
WD is a measure often used in Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) training [8, 30, 31]. While
WD does not lead to suitable closed form estimates from data, the maximization in (1) can be
performed over a parametric family of functions F := {f(·;θ) : θ ∈ Θ}. Accordingly, by selecting
an expressive neural network architecture and appropriate regularization, we could approximate the
maximization over all C-Lipschitz functions for some constant C [8, 31, 32].2
The network in question maximizes the linear loss over a class of functions F defined by its
architecture and its regularization. Namely, for a binary valued private attribute S, it tries to assign
positive values to samples with S = 0 and negative values to samples with S = 1. Since this network
effectively tries to discriminate the privacy class from data, we name it the privacy discriminator. For
the particular privacy discriminator that approximates the Wasserstein Distance, we use the name
Wasserstein Discriminator Network (WDN).
Assuming we have N samples {(zi, si)}Ni=1 with si ∈ {0, 1} and Nj samples for which si = j, the
first part of the WDN loss is
LD(Z, s;θD) =
1
N1
∑
si=1
φD(zi;θD)− 1
N0
∑
si=0
φD(zi;θD), (7)
where Z = [z1 . . . zN ] is the processed data matrix, s = [s1 . . . sN ]> is the privacy label vector and
θD are the parameters of the WDN network. Note that the parameters θD minimizing the loss come
after the semi-colon.
To ensure that the WDN obeys the Lipschitz constraint, we also need to apply some regularization.
The first networks approximating WD maintained Lipschitz functions via weight clipping [8], and
later works have introduced gradient penalties [31], as well as other terms that ensure the network is
consistent with the Lipschitz constraint on and around the input samples {zi}Ni=1 [32]. We utilize the
gradient penalty introduced in [31], which can be written as
LR(Z;θD) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(‖∇ziφD(zi;θD)‖2 − 1)2 , (8)
where ∇zφD(z;θD) denotes the gradient of the WDN function φD(·;θD) with respect to its input.
Notice that (8) forces the norm of the gradient to be close to 1 instead of being smaller than 1, which
2Note that the Lipschitz constant simply scales the WD, hence its exact value is not important.
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is actually what being 1-Lipschitz is equivalent to for differentiable functions. This is due to the
observation in the original work [31], which finds the two-sided penalty to work slightly better. It is
argued that the extra penalty likely does not lead to a significant constraint on the discriminator.
It is well-known that such penalties only force the function φD(·;θD) to be Lipschitz on the data
samples {zi}Ni=1 and not in general. This is tolerable given we are only dealing with empirical
distributions, and we do not apply the discriminator function across the full support of the underlying
distributions. It is worth keeping in mind, however, that we can extend the Lipschitz constraint to the
vicinity of the samples by adding noise to zi in (8).
With the linear discriminator loss (7) and the Lipschitz regularizer (8), the overall loss of the WDN is
given by
LDisc(Z, s;θD) = LD(Z, s;θD) + λLR(Z;θD), (9)
where λ is the regularization parameter. Our privacy enhancing feature maps then try to drive the
discriminator loss to be as high as possible to ensure the private information cannot be inferred
successfully. Therefore, the (adversarial) privacy loss of our data desensitizing network φP (·;θP ) is
given by
LP (X, s,θD;θP ) = − 1
N1
∑
si=1
φD(φP (xi;θP );θD) +
1
N0
∑
si=0
φD(φP (xi;θP );θD). (10)
Note that the WDN parameters θD come before the semi-colon, hence, they are treated as constants
here, with θP being the optimization parameters. The parameters θP ,θD are, thus, optimized
jointly towards the two opposing goals: Hiding private information and inferring private information,
respectively.
2.2.3 Using IPMs with L-ary Private Attributes
We employ a One-vs-Rest approach to generalize the binary MMD and WD objectives to L-ary
objectives. Assume that S ∈ {0, 1, . . . , L − 1}, define pii = P[S = i], Pi = PZ|S=i and Qi =
PZ|S 6=i. Let Zi ∼ Pi and Z¯i ∼ Qj . A combined objective can be written as the weighted linear
combination of IPMs
L−1∑
i=0
pii sup
f∈F
{
E [f(Zi)]− E
[
f(Z¯i)
]}
. (11)
Notice that if S is binary, (11) reduces to (1) due to the function classes we consider being closed
under additive inverses.
We apply this generalization to the MMD objective (2) to yield a multi-class version. Assuming we
have N samples {(zi, si)}Ni=1 with si ∈ {0, 1, . . . , L− 1} and Nl samples for which si = l,
L−1∑
l=0
Nl
N
√√√√ 1
N2l
∑
si=l
∑
sj=l
k(zi, zj) +
1
N
2
l
∑
si 6=l
∑
sj 6=l
k(zi, zj)− 2
NlN l
∑
si=l
∑
sj 6=l
k(zi, zj), (12)
where N l = N −Nl is the size of the complement class. Once again, this yields the binary MMD
(2), if si ∈ {0, 1}.
For the Wasserstein Discriminator Network (WDN), we generalize the discriminator loss (7) and the
Lipschitz regularizer (8) separately. Our corresponding discriminator loss is
LD(Z, s;θD) =
L−1∑
l=0
Nl
N
 1
Nl
∑
si=l
φDl(zi;θD)−
1
N l
∑
si 6=l
φDl(zi;θD)
 , (13)
where we denote by φDl the (l+ 1)
th output of the WDN. The discriminator thus has L outputs, each
meant to distinguish one privacy class from the rest. We should normally train a separate network
for each class (or L− 1 networks to avoid redundancy) for (13) to be consistent with (11). Having a
shared network is much more computationally efficient, however, especially in instances where the
number of privacy classes is large. Therefore, we make a compromise to utilize the shared structure
between the L discriminator tasks.
For the Lipschitz regularizer, we elected to apply the gradient penalty to the output corresponding to
the privacy class of a sample. The reason for this is that, if we apply L gradient penalties per sample,
the amount of memory usage required for back-propagation can grow very large in instances with
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large L. To avoid significant constraints on the usable batch sizes, we thus apply one gradient penalty
per sample. Since much of the WDN structure is shared between privacy classes (with only difference
being the final linear mapping), this type of regularization still suffices to achieve a Lipschitz constant
on all the network outputs. The resulting regularizer is given by
LR(Z, s;θD) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(∥∥∇ziφDsi(zi;θD)∥∥2 − 1)2 . (14)
The overall privacy discriminator loss is once again the sum of the discriminator loss and the Lipschitz
regularizer as in (9). The privacy objective for our data desensitizing network φP (·;θP ) is also the
inverse of the discriminator loss as in (10),
LP (X, s,θD;θP )
=
L−1∑
l=0
Nl
N
− 1
Nl
∑
si=l
φDl(φP (xi;θP );θD) +
1
N l
∑
si 6=l
φDl(φP (xi;θP );θD)
 . (15)
2.3 Least Squares Based Criteria
We established MMD and WD as feasible privacy objectives, if the private variables are discrete.
Kernel Ridge Regression (KRR) [10] and the Least Squares Generative Adversarial Networks [9]
provide additional objectives suitable for the more general case, where the private variables can be
continuous. Hence, we will present the Kernel Discriminant Information (KDI) and the Least Squares
Discriminator Networks (LSDNs) as additional tools for enhancing privacy.
2.3.1 Kernel Discriminant Information (KDI)
We start covering the least squares-based criteria with the Kernel Discriminant Information (KDI)
criterion [20], because it provides us with a closed form privacy objective similar to MMD. Let us
denote the privacy label matrix by P and consider a KRR predictor as the privacy discriminator. We
can then express the minimum loss of the privacy discriminator (MLPD) as
MLPD = min
W,b
∥∥∥Φ>W +−→1 b> −P∥∥∥2
F
+ ρ ‖W‖2F , (16)
where Φ := [φk(z1) . . . φk(zN )] is a matrix containing RKHS mappings of the processed data
samples {zi}Ni=1 such that φ>k (zi)φk(zj) = k(zi, zj).
Setting the gradients equal to zero yields the optimal bias vector b∗ = N−1
(
P>
−→
1 −W>Φ−→1
)
and weight matrix W∗ =
(
S¯ + ρI
)−1
Φ¯P¯, with S¯ = Φ¯Φ¯>, Φ¯ = ΦC, P¯ = CP. Notice that
Φ¯P¯ = ΦCCP = ΦCP = Φ¯P. Upon plugging in the optimal solution to the minimization in (16),
we can express the MLPD as
MLPD = − trace
((
S¯ + ρI
)−1
SB
)
+
∥∥P¯∥∥2
F
, (17)
where SB = Φ¯PP>Φ¯
>. SB is the well known between-class scatter matrix when P is a class
indicator matrix with each column scaled to be unit norm. However, this definition naturally
encompasses the regression setting with arbitrary P. Ignoring the constant term, we see that the
minimum loss of the privacy discriminator can be maximized by minimizing the quantity we refer to
as the Discriminant Information (DI), which is trace
((
S¯ + ρI
)−1
SB
)
[10].
For our purposes, we shall define a kernelized equivalent of DI (i.e., KDI), which does not rely on
explicit RKHS mappings of the data. For this, we first express UΣV> = Φ¯ as the compact SVD
of the matrix Φ¯. Noting that S¯ = Φ¯Φ¯> = UΣ2U>, K¯ = Φ¯>Φ¯ = VΣ2V>, U>U = I = V>V
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and using the cyclical property of the trace, we get
KDI ≡ DI = trace
((
S¯ + ρI
)−1
SB
)
(18)
= trace
(
ΣU>U
(
Σ2 + ρI
)−1
U>UΣV>PP>V
)
(19)
= trace
(
Σ2V>V
(
Σ4 + ρΣ2
)−1
V>VΣ2V>PP>V
)
(20)
= trace
((
K¯2 + ρK¯
)+
KB
)
, (21)
where KB = K¯PP>K¯. We use the expression of KDI given by (21), which allows us to plug in the
centered kernel matrix as a function of the processed data matrix: K¯ = Ck(Z,Z)C.
The ridge regularizer ρ‖W‖2F in (16) plays the l2 regularizer role in the Reproducing Kernel Hilbert
Space (RKHS), hence, it has the effect of constraining the function class into some l2 ball [33]. For
this reason, KDI measures the minimum least-squares error achieved in some l2 ball of the RKHS,
similar to how MMD measures the minimum linear loss achieved in the unit l2 ball.
In the binary classification setting, the main practical difference between MMD and KDI is that
MMD directly measures the Euclidean distance between mean embeddings in an RKHS, whereas
KDI measures the Euclidean distance after whitening. That is, KDI multiplies the mean embeddings
with the square root of the inverse of the sample covariance matrix (with a ridge regularizer added).
To see this, consider the simpler case where P := p is a vector containing the class labels 0 and 1.
Then, we have
trace(SB) = p
>ΦΦ
>
p = N21 ‖µ1 − µ‖2 =
N21N
2
0
N2
‖µ1 − µ0‖2 , (22)
where µ := 1N
∑N
i=1 φk(zi) denotes the overall mean; µj :=
1
Nj
∑
si=j
φk(zi), Nj denote the
mean and number of samples of the privacy class j, respectively. Except for the constant factor
δ = (N1N0/N)2, trace(SB) then yields the square of the MMD statistic in (2) after utilizing the
kernel trick. For many commonly used kernels, this relationship allows us to bound the KDI above
and below in terms of MMD2. For the Gaussian kernel, for example, the following result is obtained.
δ
N + ρ
MMD2 =
δ
N + ρ
‖µ1 − µ0‖2 (23)
≤ λmin
((
S¯ + ρI
)−1)
trace (SB) (24)
≤ trace
((
S¯ + ρI
)−1
SB
)
(25)
≤ λmax
((
S¯ + ρI
)−1)
trace (SB) (26)
≤ δ
ρ
‖µ1 − µ0‖2 =
δ
ρ
MMD2, (27)
where for the second and third inequalities, we used the fact that the eigenvalues of S¯ + ρI are
bounded above and below by N +ρ and ρ, respectively, which also bounds the inner product between
symmetric positive semi-definite matrices [34]. The bound on the eigenvalues is a consequence of
the Gaussian kernel matrix having unit diagonals and the fact that S¯, K¯ have the same non-zero
eigenvalues.3 Similar bounds can be established for all other kernels when they are applied to compact
data domains, as the maximum eigenvalues will always be bounded in such instances. For all the
RBF kernels satisfying k(x,x) = 1, the same result applies,
δ
N + ρ
MMD2 ≤ KDI ≤ δ
ρ
MMD2. (28)
While MMD and KDI will have different performances on finite samples, they are both consistent
statistics for testing the equality of distributions when used with universal kernels [25, 35]. For this
reason, and the bound we established in (28), KDI is a suitable alternative to MMD, which also
generalizes to continuous variables.
3Unit diagonals ensure that trace(K) = N , since the trace is the sum of eigenvalues, the maximum
eigenvalue has to be smaller than N . Additionally, λmax(S¯) = λmax(K¯) = λmax(CKC) ≤ λmax(K), since
C is another symmetric positive semi-definite matrix with λmax(C) = 1.
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Figure 1: A schematic of a neural network classifier separated between private and public spheres.
The private sphere ends with a narrow layer, which is where the privacy objectives are applied.
2.3.2 Least Squares Discriminator Network (LSDN)
Another privacy discriminator we consider is the Least Squares Discriminator Network (LSDN),
which is a neural network minimizing the squared error of its predictions [9]. The objective of LSDN
can be written as
LD(Z,P;θD) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
‖φD(zi;θD)− si‖2 . (29)
Differently from the WDN, the privacy objective of the data desensitizing network is not given simply
by the inverse of the discriminator loss. Instead, the data desensitization explicitly tries to make all
predictions of the privacy discriminator the same as the mean prediction, that is, the best prediction
LSDN could make if Z = φP (X;θP ) contained no information on the privacy labels P. Therefore,
the (adversarial) privacy loss minimized by θP is given by
LP (X,P,θD;θP ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
‖φD(φP (xi;θP );θD)− µ‖2 , (30)
where µ = 1N
∑N
i=1 si. This definition of the privacy loss leads to a functionality similar to that of
KDI. KDI (21) being 0 implies the best KRR predictor always predicts the target mean µ, whereas,
the privacy loss (30) being 0 implies the LSDN φD(·; θD) always predicts the target mean.
In the binary classification setting, where si ∈ {0, 1}, minimizing (30) against a discriminator
minimizing (29) was shown, in effect, to be a minimization of Pearson’s χ2 divergence between
distributions [9]. Our definition of the losses allows privacy enhancing feature maps to be optimized
based on continuous-valued private attributes as well.
3 Methodology
In Sections 2.2 and 2.3, we have introduced multiple privacy objectives that can help remove
dependencies between released data and private variables. The next step is to combine these training
objectives with feature maps and utility objectives so that we can ensure the data serves the intended
utility goal after being cleaned from unwanted dependencies.
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3.1 Network Architectures
To produce a system that meets the utility goals of users without revealing their private information,
the data desensitization has to be performed in the private sphere. After the desensitization process,
predictive models can be applied to the data to infer information that is desirable to the user. To
seamlessly incorporate the optimization of the public and private sphere models, it is natural to
consider the two parts as a single feed-forward network, which are separated only by where the
computations are performed. A simple structure of this sort is displayed in Figure 1. The private
sphere ends with a narrow, funneling layer, which outputs a low-dimensional representation of the
original data. This low-dimensional output also constitutes the input of the public sphere, which does
not get access to the original data.
The privacy objectives described in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 can be applied to the output of the private
sphere to ensure that the low-dimensional representations that are sent out reveal minimal private
information. The utility objectives, on the other hand, are best applied to the outputs of the public
sphere, since the end goal is to get the most accurate predictions out of the entire network.
For dense neural networks (DNN), no special structure needs to be applied other than a narrow layer
at the end of the private sphere. Hence, the mappings learned in the public and private spheres are
highly flexible. For our experiments, we apply a softmax layer to the outputs of the private sphere
for classification goals, and we use the Rectified Linear Units (ReLU) [36], i.e., f(x) = max(0, x),
as activations for all hidden layers, including the narrow, funneling layer. This choice is partially
motivated by the fact that we found non-invertible activation functions to improve the privacy
performances of the resulting feature maps.
For convolutional neural network (CNN) architectures, an important characteristic to keep in mind is
that each feature is a function of a small subset of input pixels. However, for the effective removal
of sensitive information, output features generally need to be global functions of the input features.
For CNNs to produce high level representations that are global functions of the input, many layers
of convolutions are typically needed. This in turn can result in a huge computational overhead on
the user side. Hence, to achieve relatively shallow convolutional feature mappings that produce
global functions of the input pixels, we try to incorporate dense layers into CNNs without removing
spacial correlations between pixels. Subspace projections enable us to perform such dense mappings
[37, 38].
We can achieve subspace projections between convolutional layers by inserting a mapping
φ(x) = W>h(x) and h˜(x) = Wφ(x), (31)
where W has orthonormal columns (W>W = I), h(x) denotes a flattened hidden layer and h˜(x)
denotes its reconstruction from φ(x). The addition of orthonormal projections provides a cheap way
of reconstructing images from their dense mappings based on the squared error criterion, and we
achieve orthonormality in the projection matrix W by adding the following penalty to our training
objective
LO =
∥∥W>W − I∥∥2
F
(32)
In our experiments, a penalty factor of 10 sufficed to obtain nearly orthonormal projection matrices
with the penalty (32) becoming less than 10−4. To give the network more freedom in choosing active
projection directions, we also add ReLU activations and bias terms
φ(x) = ReLU(W>h(x) + b) and h˜(x) = Wφ(x), (33)
where φ(x) denotes the output of the private sphere. With this mapping, projection directions whose
component values fall below a certain threshold get discarded, hence, the reconstructions can be based
on a smaller number of projection directions than the number of columns of W. We found that this
modification improves the privacy performances of CNNs within the private sphere without hindering
the ultimate utility performance of the system as a whole. We do not use these orthonormal projection
layers in dense neural networks, since we are not worried about maintaining spacial correlations
between dense layers.
3.2 Network Objectives for Utility and Privacy
In this section, we summarize the training objectives of predictive neural network models, which are
split between a private sphere and a public sphere. For a general treatment, we consider the tuple
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Figure 2: The structure of the optimized system. Private sphere network feeds the public sphere
network and the privacy discriminator, whose outputs are used to compute the utility and privacy
objectives, respectively. A green dashed line indicates the network serves the objective(s), while a
red dashed line indicates the network hinders the objective(s).
(X,Y,P) as our training dataset, which consists of an N -columned data matrix X, and N -rowed
utility and privacy label matrices Y and P, respectively. Accordingly, xi, yi and si refer to the input
features, utility label and privacy label for the ith sample, respectively. To denote the mappings
performed by the private sphere network, the public sphere network and the privacy discriminator
network, we use φP (x;θP ), φU (φP (x;θP );θU ) and φD(φP (x;θP );θD), respectively, where θP ,
θU and θD are the parameters of these respective networks. We also remind that we use φ(Z;θ) :=
[φ(z1;θ) . . . φ(zN ;θ)] to represent an entire data matrix Z after being processed by a network φ(·;θ).
The structure of our optimized system is summarized in Figure 2. The public and private sphere
networks both serve the utility prediction goal, hence, they are complementary in nature. The privacy
discriminator, on the other hand, serves the privacy prediction goal, which the private sphere network
tries to hinder, thus, these networks are adversarial in nature. Note that the privacy discriminator
only exists in settings where we use the adversarial WDN (15) and LSDN (30) losses as our privacy
objectives. The outputs of the (kernel based) privacy discriminators are already incorporated into the
MMD (12) and KDI (21) objectives, hence, no explicit privacy discriminator is needed for optimizing
them. Below, we go over the utility and privacy objectives and the networks optimizing them.
3.2.1 The Utility Objective for the Private and Public Spheres
We use the traditional utility objectives for training neural network predictors, namely, the Cross-
Entropy (CE) loss for classification tasks. If the utility label yi is a vector containing class probabili-
ties, the utility loss function is given by
LU (X,Y;θP ,θU ) = − 1
N
N∑
i=1
y>i log(φU (φP (xi;θP );θU )), (34)
where log(·) denotes the element-wise logarithm. This utility objective is always applied when
optimizing θP ,θU , regardless of the type of privacy objective and network architecture used.
3.2.2 The Privacy Objectives for the Private Sphere
Below are the privacy objectives we utilize for optimizing θP . To give readers a simplified perspective
on these, we summarize their key properties in Table 1.
MMD: We use the privacy objective in (12), but express it more succintly in matrix form. Let the
privacy label matrix P contain the one-hot encodings of privacy classes in its rows. Let pl denote the
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Table 1: Summary of the privacy objectives.
Objective Discriminator Variable Type Objective Format
MMD Kernel Network Discrete Closed Form Statistic (35)
KDI Kernel Network Discrete, Continuous Closed Form Statistic (37)
WDN Neural Network Discrete Adversarial Network Loss (38)
LSDN Neural Network Discrete, Continuous Adversarial Network Loss (39)
lth column of the N × L matrix P, and pl =
−→
1 − pl, then the privacy loss function is
LP (X,P;θP )
=
L∑
l=1
Nl
N
√
1
N2l
p>l K(X;θP )pl +
1
N
2
l
p>l K(X;θP )pl −
2
NlN l
p>l K(X;θP )pl, (35)
where Nl =
−→
1 >pl, N l =
−→
1 >pl, and K(X;θP ) = k(φP (X;θP ), φP (X;θP )) is the N × N
kernel matrix obtained by applying a kernel function k(·, ·) to the processed data matrix φP (X;θP ).
Our choice of kernel function is a mixture of Gaussians,
k(zi, zj) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
exp
(
−‖zi − zj‖
2
2
2σ2t
)
, (36)
where {σt}Tt=1 = {1, 2, 4, 8, 16}. This is the same setting as in [28, 7], where MMD was utilized for
training GANs.
KDI: We utilize the privacy objective in (21), which leads to the privacy loss function
LP (X,P;θP ) = trace
((
K¯2(X;θD) + ρK¯(X;θD)
)+
K¯(X;θD)PP
>K¯(X;θD)
)
, (37)
where K¯(X;θD) = CK(X;θD)C, with C = I− 1N 1 being the centering matrix. K(X;θD) is the
same kernel matrix used in the definition of the MMD objective.
WDN: We use the inverse of the Wasserstein Discriminator Network objective from (13). Let the
privacy label matrix P contain the one-hot encodings of privacy classes in its rows. Let pl denote the
lth column of the N × L matrix P and pl =
−→
1 − pl, the privacy loss function is given by
LP (X,P,θD;θP )
= −
L∑
l=1
Nl
N
(
1
Nl
φD(φP (X;θP );θD)pl − 1
N l
φD(φP (X;θP );θD)pl
)
, (38)
where Nl =
−→
1 >pl, N l =
−→
1 >pl.
LSDN: We use the adversarial training objective from (30), which leads to the privacy loss function
LP (X,P,θD;θP ) =
1
N
∥∥∥∥φD(φP (X;θP );θD)− 1NP>−→1−→1 >
∥∥∥∥2
F
. (39)
Note that the MMD (35) and KDI (37) objectives are free from the parameters θD. This is because
these closed-form statistics do not require an explicit discriminator network to be defined. For the
WDN (38) and LSDN (39) objectives to work, we have to optimize a privacy discriminator jointly
with the private and public sphere networks.
Another important distinction is the settings in which these four privacy losses are definable. Namely,
KDI (37) and LSDN (39) losses are defined for any arbitrary label matrix P, whereas MMD (35) and
WDN (38) losses are only defined if P contains one-hot encodings of class labels. This is because
MMD and WDN are only defined for discrete variables and are not suitable for continuous variables.
3.2.3 The Objectives for The Privacy Discriminator
Below are the discriminator objectives we utilize for optimizing θD.
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WDN: The overall loss of this network is the sum of the linear discriminator loss LD (13) and the
Lipschitz penalty LR (14). If the privacy label matrix P contains the one-hot encodings of privacy
classes in its rows, these losses can be written as
LD(X,P,θP ;θD) =
L∑
l=1
Nl
N
( 1
Nl
φD(φP (X;θP );θD)pl − 1
N l
φD(φP (X;θP );θD)pl
)
, (40)
LR(X,P,θP ;θD) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(∥∥∥∇φp(xi;θP ) (s>i φD(φp(xi;θP );θD))∥∥∥2 − 1)2 , (41)
where pl refers to the lth column of P, while si refers to the ith row of P, pl =
−→
1 −pl,Nl = −→1 >pl,
N l =
−→
1 >pl. The overall WDN objective is then given by
LDisc(X,P,θP ;θD) = LD(φp(X;θP ),P,θP ;θD) + λRLR(φp(X;θP ),P,θP ;θD). (42)
We use λR = 10 in our experiments, which is consistent with the work on Wasserstein GANs that
proposed this regularizer [30].
LSGAN: This network minimizes the squared error in (29) with no regularizer, so the LSDN objective
is given by
LDisc(X,P,θP ;θD) =
1
N
∥∥φD(φP (X;θP );θD)−P>∥∥2F . (43)
3.3 The Training Procedure
Let us first write the overall network losses minimized by the private sphere network, public sphere
network and the privacy discriminator, respectively. The private sphere network minimizes a linear
combination of the utility loss LU (34) and one of the MMD (35), KDI (37), WDN (38), LSDN (39)
privacy losses LP ,
LPri(X,Y,P,θU ,θD;θP ) = LU (X,Y;θP ,θU ) + λPLP (X,P,θD;θP ), (44)
where λP controls the importance of the privacy objective. We shall vary this parameter in our exper-
iments to showcase the utility/privacy trade-offs with different objectives and network architectures.
If we use CNNs as our private and public sphere networks, we also add dense subspace projection
layers to the intersection of the private and public spheres as in (33). In this case, we also add the
orthonormality penalty (32) to (44).
The public sphere network only minimizes the utility loss LU (34),
LPub(X,Y,θP ;θU ) = LU (X,Y;θP ,θU ). (45)
Finally, if we utilize the WDN (38) or the LSDN (39) loss as our privacy objective, we train a privacy
discriminator network that minimizes LDisc as given by (42) or (43), respectively.
We use Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) methods to jointly optimize these networks, therefore, the
loss gradients are computed based on mini-batches, which are subsets of the training set (X,Y,P).
Due to the adversarial nature of the private sphere network with respect to the privacy discriminator,
we keep the step size of the private sphere network smaller than the step size of the privacy discrim-
inator. This is to ensure that the privacy discriminator can adapt to changes in the private sphere
network. Of course, this is no concern when we are using the MMD and KDI objectives.
We found that applying regularizers like drop-out and batch-normalization to private and public
sphere networks can help generalize to the utility prediction task. However, these methods should not
be applied to the privacy discriminator, since this alters the privacy objectives, which can significantly
lower the privacy performance of the private sphere network. Therefore, we apply drop-out to the
private and public sphere networks during training, except for the narrow, funneling layer at the
intersection of these networks.
4 Experiments
We perform two sets of experiments to verify the effectiveness of the model architectures and learning
objectives presented in the previous section. The first set of experiments is concerned with optimizing
linear projections in the private sphere, and the second is concerned with optimizing CNN mappings.
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To facilitate meaningful comparisons among the four privacy objectives, we consider settings with
discrete privacy variables in these experiments.
We use the Adam optimizer [39] with a batch size of 500 throughout our experiments. We set the step
size to 10−3 while optimizing the private and public sphere networks with the MMD (35) and KDI
(37) privacy objectives. We use a step size of 10−3 for the privacy discriminator and a step size of
10−4 for the public and private sphere networks while using the WDN (38) and LSDN (39) privacy
objectives. The learning rates are periodically reduced by a factor of 10−1 during training, which we
generally found to improve the utility/privacy performances.
4.1 Learning Privacy Enhancing Linear Projections
We start our experiments with one of the simplest data processing methods on the user side, which
is linear projections. We use the HAR [40] and MHEALTH [41] datasets in these experiments.
We perform 10 randomized experiments with different splits of these data and report the average
performances.
The HAR data contains 561-feature samples from 30 users performing 6 activities. We split the
8430 samples into training and test sets with 80 : 20 ratios, and make sure the training and test sets
contain the same proportion of samples from each user. The original split of this dataset ensures that
training and test sets have non-overlapping users, hence, it is possible to predict user activities without
using information related to user identity. For this reason, we consider the activity recognition as
the utility prediction task, and identity recognition as the privacy prediction task. We set the linear
projection dimensions to 50. We found this dimensionality to be sufficient for maintaining the utility
performance on this dataset.
The MHEALTH data contains 23-feature samples from 10 users performing 12 activities. We extract
12000 frames (100 frames per activity per user) for our training set and 3000 frames (25 frames per
activity per user) for our test set. We ensure that there is at least a 400 frame separation between the
training and test sets. Once again, we consider the activity recognition as the utility prediction task,
and identity recognition as the privacy prediction task. We set the linear projection dimensions to
10 for this data. While this subspace dimensionality was found to be restrictive in the sense that it
inevitably reduces the utility performance, we chose it due to the fact that the original number of
features is small on this data.
Linear projections for preserving privacy were optimized using Discriminant Analysis related methods
in previous works. To showcase the improvements we can get over these, we build a system to
optimize privacy enhancing/utility preserving linear projections in progressive stages. These are
listed below.
• Discriminant Utility-Cost Analysis (DUCA) [20, 38]: Optimizes linear projections based
on the objective
maximize
W : W>(X¯X¯>+ρI)W=I
trace
(
W>
(
X¯YY>X¯> − ρ′I− λP X¯PP>X¯>
)
W
)
, (46)
where X¯ = XC is the centered data matrix. The ridge regularizers ρ, ρ′ are set according to
[20, 38] and the optimal solutions are found via generalized eigenvalue decomposition. The
significance of this method is that it uses the linear variant of the DI criterion for both the
utility objective and the privacy objective.
• DUCA-MMD: We use the utility part of the DUCA objective (46), but replace the privacy
objective with MMD, that is, by considering φP (X;θP ) = W>X, this system minimizes
the loss function
− trace
((
W>X¯X¯>W + ρI
)−1
W>X¯YY>X¯>W
)
+ λPLP (X,P;θP ), (47)
where θP := W and LP is the MMD objective in (35). We use the equivalent RR predictor
as the public sphere network to minimize the utility loss, since we established the equivalence
between DI and minimum RR loss in Section 2.3.1.
• NN-MMD: We use a public sphere network minimizing the cross-entropy (CE) loss in
addition to the private sphere network φP (X;θP ) = ReLU(W>X + b) minimizing the
MMD version of (44). Note that the addition of the bias term and rectified linear units
is computationally negligible, but they can add privacy benefits due to ReLU being non-
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Figure 3: Utility vs. Privacy trade-off curves obtained from the presented linear projections applied
to the HAR (top) and MHEALTH (bottom) datasets. Left figures compare our system with alternative
linear methods, and the right figures compare our systems with each other using different privacy
objectives.
invertible. The public sphere network φU (·;θU ) consists of one hidden layer with 500 units
and an output layer. The optimization of these networks was performed as we described in
Section 3.3.
• NN-KDI/WDN/LSDN: We use the same private and public sphere networks as NN-MMD,
but replace the privacy loss with one of the three alternatives described in the previous
sections. The privacy discriminators φD(·;θD) of the WDN and LSDN models consist of
one hidden layer with 1024 units and an output layer.
To test the privacy performances of these models, we train Random Forest (RF) predictors with 250
trees each. This choice is motivated by the observation that sophisticated models easily over-fit the
privacy task after a data desensitizing feature mapping φP (X;θP ) is applied. For this reason, we
choose a powerful enough model that is also robust to over-fitting. We also use the RF predictors
to test the utility performances of DUCA and DUCA-MMD models, because these do not optimize
utility predictors themselves. The utility performances of the NN-MMD/KDI/WDN/LSDN models
were measured as the performances of their public sphere predictors, which minimize the softmax
cross-entropy loss for the utility prediction task.
Figure 3 shows our comparisons among the methods considered. The full-dimensional points
represent the utility and privacy performances when the original data are released. The methods we
propose improve the privacy performances over this scenario, but they eventually reduce both the
utility and privacy performances down to random guessing (at high privacy parameter settings).
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The comparison between DUCA and DUCA-MMD demonstrates the potential gain from utilizing
non-linear privacy objectives even while optimizing linear projections. We see that DUCA does a
relatively poor job at desensitizing the data, mainly because it only captures the linear correlations
between variables. Due to this limitation, DUCA becomes insensitive to changes in the privacy
parameter after all the linear correlations between the projected data and private variables are
removed.4 DUCA-MMD, on the other hand, utilizes the MMD privacy objective, which is sensitive to
non-linear correlations between the projected data and private variables. Thus, it is able to remove
more private information at high privacy settings. This results in a better utility/privacy trade-off on
HAR data, where we learn a 561× 50 projection matrix (a relatively high degree of freedom), though
the trade-off is not improved by much on MHEALTH, where we learn a 23× 10 projection matrix (a
relatively low degree of freedom).
Finally, our NN-MMD method achieves an extremely desirable utility/privacy trade-off on HAR data
by being able to lower the privacy performance close to random guessing without sacrificing much
utility performance. Although linear projections prove too restrictive on MHEALTH data to achieve
ideal utility/privacy performances, NN-MMD also improves the utility/privacy trade-off significantly
here. This is thanks to the joint optimization of the public and private sphere networks in addition to
the more general utility and privacy objectives being utilized. Among our own methods, NN-MMD
and NN-KDI achieve statistically identical performances, with NN-WDN being a close second and
NN-LSDN performing worse than the other three methods on HAR data. On the other hand, these
four methods achieve very similar performances on MHEALTH.
The experiments in this section involved only a single, narrow processing layer in the private sphere.
We show in the next section that, by adding more processing layers into the private sphere, the
utility/privacy performances can be improved further.
4.2 Learning Privacy Enhancing CNNs
In this section, we consider adding CNN layers both before and after the privacy enhancing subspace
projections. We use the extended YaleB [42] and MeGlass [43] datasets for these experiments, both
of which consist of face images. Once again, we perform 10 randomized experiments with different
splits of these data and report the average performances.
YaleB data contains 2414 face images from 38 individuals. We split this data into training and test
sets with a 80 : 20 ratio, making sure the sets contain the same proportion of samples from each
individual. The face images are reshaped to be 32× 32, and we randomly divide the individuals into
4 groups to create a utility prediction task that corresponds to accessing coarser granular information
about user identity. Hence, we treat the prediction of the user group as the utility prediction task
and the prediction of the individual identity as the privacy prediction task. Notice that hiding all the
sensitive information in this setting destroys all the utility information as well, so privacy cannot be
improved beyond a certain level without sacrificing utility performance.
MeGlass data contains 47917 face images from 1565 individuals, each of whom have at least two
photos with glasses and two photos without glasses. We randomly select 500 of these individuals for
each experiment, which leads to roughly 15600 samples per experiment. We split these samples into
training and test sets with a 80 : 20 ratio, keeping the proportion of samples from each individual
consistent. To reduce the number of classes in the adversarial learning task, we randomly split the
500 individuals into 100 groups of 5 (the number of samples can differ across groups, but no group
becomes larger than 4.5% of the data). Accordingly, we treat glass detection as the utility prediction
task and detection of an individual’s group as the privacy prediction task. Based on the original
purpose of this dataset, we know that glass detection can be performed independently from a person’s
identity, hence, we expect our methods to achieve near ideal utility/privacy trade-offs on this data.
We build upon the system we designed in the previous section, and develop a privacy enhancing CNN
architecture in progressive stages. The projection dimensions are set to 50 across the models (i.e., the
narrow, funneling layer has 50 units in all the models where it exists). While the CNNs considered in
this section are very rudimentary compared to the state of the art, we found that they are sufficient to
perform well on these simpler learning tasks on relatively small benchmark datasets. The models we
consider are listed below.
4We also consider random guessing the utility and privacy variables as part of the DUCA trade-off curves,
because it represents choosing not to share any information at all.
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Figure 4: Utility vs. Privacy trade-off curves obtained from the presented structures applied to the
YaleB and MeGlass datasets. Left figures compare different architectures using the same objectives,
and the right figures compare the same architectures using different privacy objectives.
• NN-MMD: This has the same model structure and objectives as the NN-MMD in the
previous section. We have a private sphere network φP (X;θP ) = ReLU(W>X + b) and
a public sphere network φU (·;θU ), which consists of one hidden layer with 1024 units and
an output layer.
• CNN-MMD: This optimizes the same model objectives as NN-MMD, but both the private
and public sphere models are replaced by CNNs. The private sphere network φP (X;θP )
consists of one convolutional layer with 32 3× 3 filters followed by 2× 2 max-pooling. The
public sphere network φU (·;θU ) consists of one convolutional layer with 64 3× 3 filters
followed by 2× 2 max-pooling, one dense layer with 1024 units and an output layer. No
subspace projection takes place between private and public spheres.
• SCNN-MMD: We add a subspace projection layer (33) at the intersection of the pri-
vate and public sphere networks. Accordingly, the new private sphere network becomes
φP (X;θP ) = ReLU(W
>φ′P (X;θP ) + b) and the new public sphere network becomes
φU (Z;θU ) = φ
′
U (WZ;θU ), where φ
′
P and φ
′
U are the private and public sphere networks
from CNN-MMD, respectively, and W is an orthonormal matrix obtained by adding the
penalty (32) to the private sphere network objective. We found the orthonormality of W to
be crucial for this model to be able to perform the utility task.
• SCNN-KDI/WDN/LSDN: We use the same private and public sphere networks as NN-
MMD, but replace the privacy loss with one of the three alternatives described in the
previous sections. For the privacy discriminators φD(·;θD) of the WDN and LSDN models,
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we found that using dense networks leads to better results.5 Thus, we use two hidden layers
with 1024 units each for the privacy discriminators.
Comparisons of these models are displayed in Figure 4. We see that CNN-MMD does not achieve
desirable trade-offs, proving completely ineffective on YaleB data and having very limited success in
hiding private information on MeGlass data. This is because a single CNN layer only performs local
transformations of input features, making shallow CNNs incapable of performing utility maximizing
and privacy preserving transformations that need to be global in scale. Adding subspace projections
between convolutional layers alleviates this problem, which is why SCNN-MMD achieves far more
desirable utility/privacy trade-off curves.
Comparing SCNN-MMD and NN-MMD reveals that adding convolutions before subspace pro-
jections can significantly improve the utility performances for all levels of privacy. On YaleB, a
convolutional layer in the private sphere network allows more utility information to be preserved as
the privacy level increases, and on MeGlass, this addition improves the utility performance of the
system regardless of the privacy level.
Comparing the four privacy objectives with each other, we see once again that MMD and KDI
achieve similar performances. On YaleB, SCNN-MMD and SCNN-KDI are able to capture more
utility information in high-privacy settings, which may be due to the privacy discriminators in SCNN-
WDN and SCNN-LSDN having difficulty adjusting to the private sphere network. On MeGlass,
SCNN-MMD, SCNN-KDI, SCNN-WDN and SCNN-LSDN all achieve near perfect utility/privacy
trade-off curves (small utility performance losses, while privacy performances are near the proportions
of the majority classes), showing all the privacy objectives to be successful in this setting.
4.3 Summary
We performed four experiments, two of which explore linear projections on mobile sensing data
and two of which explore convolutional mappings on face data. These experiments reveal that it is
possible and beneficial to optimize privacy enhancing representations of the data together with the
predictors that use them as inputs. Moreover, we see that our objectives and training methods are
viable for optimizing simple linear projections as well as more complicated neural network mappings.
Two of our experiments were performed on data, where the utility prediction task can be performed
independently from the private information (user identity), namely, the HAR and MeGlass data.
Our experiments on these showcase the ability of our systems to remove almost all the sensitive
information while maintaining high utility performances. While the conditions on MHEALTH and
YaleB are not as ideal (by our design in YaleB’s case), our methods, nonetheless, allow users to select
a desired level of utility and privacy for the data processing techniques they choose.
Since the use of discriminator networks did not improve the results on any of the datasets, it seems
practical to use the closed-form MMD and KDI statistics as the privacy objective functions in general.
For discrete private variables (as in our experiments), we found MMD to be the most practical privacy
objective function to utilize, and it compares favorably to the other objectives. KDI performs very
similarly to MMD even with discrete private variables. Therefore, KDI could be a good objective in
applications with continuous private variables, though it has a higher computational cost associated
with it (cubic in batch size as opposed to quadratic). We found on HAR and YaleB datasets that,
although WDN and LSDN perform similarly to MMD and KDI in low privacy settings, they may
lead to lower utility performances in high privacy settings. It might be possible to improve these
objectives by periodically training the privacy discriminators more exhaustively, but it is unclear
whether this can lead to more desirable utility/privacy trade-offs compared to MMD and KDI with a
generic mixture of Gaussian kernels.
5 Discussion
Controlling the usage of one’s information is often not possible once that information is shared
with outside parties, hence, preemptively desensitizing their data might be one of the best defenses
users have against intrusive inferences. The methods in this paper are thus geared towards removing
5We believe that dense networks can adapt faster to the changes in the private sphere networks, which makes
dense privacy discriminators easier to train than convolutional ones.
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sensitive information from the data before the users abdicate control of them, even for a desired utility.
To motivate this approach, we demonstrated the viability of our methods with a comprehensive set of
optimization objectives and focused on computationally cheap feature maps.
While the intent of our work is to immediately benefit some applications on sensitive data, our
treatment is far from covering an exhaustive set of data processing techniques. For instance, noise
addition mechanisms could also be included in the processing before the data is released. Such a
mechanism can be optimized through the parameters of another neural network, which transforms an
independent noise distribution before it is added to the data within the private sphere.
It is worth noting that, although we only applied our methods to simple dense and convolutional
neural network models, the presented measures are suitable for optimizing more general network
architectures. For example, the privacy objectives could be applied after a series of recurrent neural
network (RNN) transformations or between the layers of Densely Connected Convolutional Neural
Networks [44] by utilizing the subspace projections in (33). While the subspace projection layers
included in the CNN architectures provide a simple method for reconstructing images from their
dense mappings, a similar functionality can be achieved by auto-encoders which are placed at the
intersection of the public and private spheres. Auto-encoders can also allow the data to be desensitized
even in the absence of well-defined utility targets, with a system trying to capture as much information
as possible while removing unwanted dependencies.
For designing systems that take into account various facets of user privacy, our compression methods
would inevitably have to be combined with other privacy paradigms and techniques. It may be
desirable for Differential Privacy mechanisms to be applied during the training of our models so that
a user’s participation is not revealed by the learned feature mappings. It may also be desirable to
perform homomorphic encryption so that users do not have to reveal sensitive information while
training the models meant to protect them. This paper scratches the surface of numerous challenges
related to privacy-preserving machine learning, and we believe it to be a critical area of research with
many developments to come.
6 Conclusion
We proposed highly flexible feature mappings and training objectives, which help sensitive infor-
mation to be removed from data intended only for a set of utility tasks. Our methods optimize the
privacy enhancing feature maps and predictive models simultaneously in an end-to-end fashion,
which enables users to limit the information they share without sacrificing the benefits from useful
data analysis. The privacy objectives we presented in this paper are comprehensive, and we hope that
they will provide a solid baseline for future works into privacy enhancing machine learning.
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